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Flinchbaugh. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this report is to provide a revised version of the publication, 
"Mathematical Formulas for Calculating Net Returns from Participation in Government 
Farm Programs for Major Crops in Kansas: Commodity Program, Crop Insurance, 
Conservation Reserve, and Disaster Aid" (Williams, Harper, and Barnaby 1989).  The 
mathematical formulas for calculating net returns presented in the earlier version are 
revised by incorporating changes legislated by the Food, Agricultural, Conservation and 
Trade Act of 1990 (FACT).  These include major revisions caused by changes in the 
0/92 program, the new FLEX acreage provision, and the new Integrated Farm 
Management Program Option (IFM).  Individuals conducting research and education 
programs will be able to use this revision for reference when estimating net returns for 
farm operators under current program provisions. 
Nine scenarios for government program participation are examined in this report: 
1.  No Commodity Program; 
2.  No Commodity Program with Crop Insurance; 
3.  No Commodity Program with the Conservation Reserve Program; 
4.  No Commodity Program with Crop Insurance and the Conservation 
Reserve Program; 
5.  Commodity Program only; 
6.  Commodity Program with Crop Insurance; 
7.  Commodity Program with the Conservation Reserve Program; 
8.  Commodity Program with Crop Insurance and the Conservation Reserve 
Program; 
9.  Commodity Program with Integrated Farm Management Program Option. 
1 The previous staff paper described scenarios involving disaster aid.  Disaster aid 
is typically available on an intermittent basis, but there is no permanent program 
scheduled for 1991 or future years.  Hence, scenarios involving it are not discussed in 
this report.  Also, the optional paid land diversion program, available in previous years 
as authorized by the 1985 Food Security Act, was reauthorized in the 1990 Farm Bill. 
However, the program is not currently offered by the USDA and, therefore, is not 
included in the scenarios. 
The equations contained in this report can be used to calculate net returns for 
single crop or multi-crop enterprises that mayor may not be enrolled in  or eligible for 
government programs.  Calculations can be done on a cash or total cost basis: total costs 
including the opportunity costs required to estimate net returns to management; labor 
and management; or land, labor, and management. 
Scenarios 1 - 4 describe the estimation of net returns when the farm enterprises 
under consideration are not enrolled in the government commodity program.  Scenarios 
5 - 9 characterize the estimation of net returns when one or more of the farm 
enterprises are enrolled in the government commodity program.  (Note: attention to the 
variables' subscripts is particularly important in scenarios 5 - 9). 
Prices and parameter values that pertain to 1991 government programs can be 
-
found in Table 1.  This report reflects the provisions as of April 1991.  Some provisions 
may change or be reinterpreted from time to time.  Although they do not affect the 
formulas in this report, the calculations of program yields for new irrigated crops are still 
being formulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) at publication time.  Additionally, some 
2 information is location specific, such as crop insurance premium rates, or farm specific, 
such as program yields, and, therefore, must be provided by the user. 
NON-PARTICIPATION IN COMMODITY PROGRAMS 
The equations in this section are used to estimate net returns when a farm 
operator is not enrolled in the government commodity program.  Formulas for 
estimating net returns for non-participation along with the use of crop insurance and/or 
participation in the conservation reserve program are also included. 
Scenario 1.  No Commodity Pro~am 
Equation (1) describes the estimation of net returns when no enterprises are 
enrolled in any government program.  Net returns are a function of commodity prices, 
yields, grazing value, and cost of production estimates.  This scenario has no price 
protection, yield protection, or income supplementation.1  The equation is: 
where: 
n 
:E  NR 
i=l  I 
n 
=  :E  {[(po * Y) - Ve. - Fe. + GVJ * PAl  i=l  I  1  1  1  I 
1  =  crop i being produced on farm, 
N~ =  net returns, crop i ($), 
Pi  =  market price, crop i ($/unit), 
(1) 
1  Income supplementation refers to additional income the farmer may receive from 
participation in certain programs, as it relates to that crop.  It does not include non-farm 
mcome. 
3 
• Yj  = average yield on planted acreage (unit/acre), 
VCj  = variable costs of production ($/  acre), 
FCj  = fixed  costs ($/  acre), 
GVj  = grazing value ($/  acre), and 
P~ = planted acres, crop i. 
Scenario 2.  No Commodity Proeram with Crop Insurance 
Equation (2) describes the option of purchasing crop insurance.  Crop insurance 
premiums are deducted from gross income because the premiums are a cost of 
production.  If  a farmer does collect a crop insurance indemnity payment, then it is 
added to gross income. 
Traditionally,  insu~able yields are determined by the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC) for areas identified as having similar soil types, production 
practices; yields, and crop loss histories.  Insurable crop yields are based on the Actual 
Production History (APH) for each farm.  Under the APH method, insurable yields are 
based on average farm yields when there are three or more years of verifiable records. 
If  the farm has 10 or more years of records, the latest 10 year average is used. 
Once the insurable yield is established, a yield guarantee level and an indemnity 
price election are selected by the farm manager.  Yield guarantees of 50%, 65%, and 
75% of the APH yield are currently available from the FCIC.  The indemnity price 
election indicates the value of possible crop loss to the farm and is selected from three 
possible values.  If  the harvested yield is less than the yield guarantee, an indemnity 
payment is received.  The indemnity payment is calculated by taking the difference 
4 between the yield guarantee and the harvested yield and mUltiplying this difference by 
the previously chosen indemnity price. 
Premium rates are predetermined by the FCIC and are based on historical yields, 
production, and crop loss for the county in which the farm is located.  The premium 
depends on the amount of coverage desired and the APR yield level.  Crop insurance 
cost per acre is found by multiplying the yield guarantee level by the indemnity price 
election and by the premium rate supplied by the FCIC (Barnaby, 1987). 
Crop insurance provides protection from production risk.  It is not intended to 
provide protection from price risk.  The indemnity price election is used to value the 
crop that is lost and does not reflect the value lost if market prices are above the price 
election selected.  In addition, crop insurance does not provide price protection when the 
harvested yield is above the yield guarantee selected (a condition that results in  no 
indemnity payments).  Only when a producer suffers a loss in excess of the yield 
guarantee and market prices are below the indemnity price selected does some degree of 
price protection exist. 
where: 





=  ~ {[(po  * Y) - VC - FC - CJ.  + Gv. +  i=l  I  I  I  I  I  I 
max  {D,  IPi * [(IYi * LCi) - YJ}] * P~} 
Cli  =  crop insurance premium ($/acre), 
where: 




= insurance yield (unit/acre) (10 year yield based on actual production 
history for insurance or assigned with the assistance of the FCIC), 
=  commodity indemnity price election (S/unit) (three price elections 
available: low, medium, or high), 
= level of coverage (three levels available: 50%, 65%, or 75%), and 
= premium rate (set by FCIC). 
Scenario 3.  No Commodity Promm with the Conservation Reserve Promm 
The 1990 Farm Bill provides for targeting of water quality and other 
environmental concerns in addition to highly erodible land.  This provision, called the 
Environment Conservation Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP), is a revision of the 
conservation provision of the Food Security Act (Farm Bill) of 1985, which established 
the Conservation  Reserv~  .. Program (CRP).  The ECARP consists of the CRP and the 
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP).  Under WRP, land owners must provide a 30 year 
or perpetual easement (subject to a maximum term specified by state laws) and agree to 
implement a wetland restoration and protection plan.  Payments may be made over a 5 
to 20 year period or in a lump sum if  the easement is perpetual.  Funding for WRP has 
not been appropriated by Congress as of publication time for this report. 
The CRP is a voluntary program encouraging farmers to establish permanent 
grass, wildlife cover, or trees on highly erodible cropland through 10-year contracts with 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Although the CRP is not 
targeted to provide protection from yield or price variability, it can have that effect 
because a guaranteed rental payment is received in return for not growing crops on the 
land in CRP.  Planted acres are reduced for participants in the CRP.  Acreage enrolled 
in the previous CRP is considered enrolled in ECARP. 
6 Annual payments are made over the course of 10 years for CRP acreage, based 
on bids submitted and approved by the USDA.  The maximum rental payment a 
participant may receive from the CRP is $50,000 in a given year.  However, CRP rental 
payments are not included in the maximum payment limitations of other USDA 
programs.  CRP acres cannot be used for grazing under normal'  circumstances, although 
the USDA may approve grazing in emergency situations. 
Equation (3) includes the impact of CRP payments on net returns. 
n  n 
iE1NRj = iE1 {[[(Pj * Yj) - VCj - FCj + GVJ * PAJ -
n 




MCj  =  maintenance cost on non-crop acres (CRP acres) ($/acre), 
ECj  =  annualized establishment costs of CRP acres ($/acre), 
CRAj  =  conservation reserve acreage (acres), and 
CRRPj  =  conservation reserve rental payment ($/  acre). 
Scenario 4.  No Commodity Promm with Crop Insurance and the Conservation 
Reserve Program 
Either crop insurance or the CRP may be used by farm operators not 
participating in government commodity programs.  Equation (4) describes how net 
returns can be estimated when both programs are selected.  Neither the provisions for 
crop insurance nor the CRP change, if  both are selected.  Equation (4) is defined as: 
7 
(3) n 
~N~  i=l 
n 
= i~l {[[(Pi • YJ - VCi - FCi - CIi + GVi + 
max {O,  IP, • [(IY, • LC,) - YJ}] • PAJ -
n 
[(MCi  + ECI + FCJ • CRAJ} + min{ ~l(CRRPI •  C~), 
$50,OOO} 
The variables are defined as before. 
COMMODI1Y PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
The following five scenarios are used for estimating net returns when the farm 
(4) 
operator participates in government commodity programs.  Equations for estimating net 
returns for participation in  these programs with the purchase of crop insurance and/or 
participation in the CRP are also described. 
The Commodity Promm and the 1990 Farm Bill 
When farm operators decide to participate in the commodity program, they elect 
to forgo the potential income from crop production on acres diverted in compliance with 
the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) in exchange for minimum price protection 
(target price) on an establisheCl average crop yield (program yield).  Participating 
farmers receive a deficiency payment per unit of program yield, based on the difference 
between the target price and the market price or the effective loan rate (whichever 
difference is smaller).  If  the market price exceeds the target price, no deficiency 
payments are received.  The deficiency payment received is in addition to the income 
received from the sale of the crop produced.  The deficiency payment per unit of 
8 measure is multiplied by the farm's program yield for the specific program crop to 
determine the deficiency payment per acre.  Commodity program payments are limited 
to $50,000 per operator plus a maximum of $75,000 from -Findley" payments and 
marketing loans.  Findley payments are calculated as the difference between the formula 
loan rate and the maximum of the effective loan rate or 12-month national.average price, 
multiplied by program yield and the number of payment acres, provided the five-month 
national average price is below the formula loan rate and equal to or above the effective 
loan rate.  H the five-month national average price exceeds the formula loan rate, no 
Findley payments are received. 
Like previous farm bills, participating farmers have to meet ARP guidelines. 
However, beginning in 1991, they must also remove an additional 15% of their base 
acreage from deficiency payment eligibility.  These acres are called the "normal" flex 
acres (these acres are sometimes referred to as "Triple Base Acres").  Farmers, at their 
choosing, may also remove up to an additional 10% of their base acres as "optional" flex 
acres.  On flex acres, farmers may grow any crop approved by the USDA (except fruit 
and vegetables), but the acres are ineligible to receive any government payments.
2  In 
short, crops on flex acres provide returns similar to crops not employing the commodity 
program (e.g., Scenario 1).  However, flex acres cannot reduce or increase a crop's base 
acreage on a farm. 
2 For example, suppose a farmer wants to determine the amount of acres eligible for 
deficiency payments.  Assume the farm has a 100 acre base for wheat, a 15% ARP, and 
15% FLEX requirements.  The farm would be eligible for deficiency payments on 70 
acres (100 - 15 - 15 = 70 payment acres).  These are the Maximum Payment Acres on 
that farm.  .If the farmer utilized the additional 10% optional flex acres, payment acres 
would be reduced by 10, to 60 maximum payment acres. 
9 Farmers may also participate in the commodity program's 0/92 option.  With this 
option, farmers may plant anywhere from 0% to 92% of their eligible payment acres and 
receive deficiency payments on the portion of the eligtble 0/92 acres left in resource 
conserving use.  The deficiency payment is received on a maximum of 92% of the 
payment acres and is guaranteed at a minimum level that is equal to the USDA 
projected deficiency payment for the program crop in question (Barnaby, 1991). 
Prior to the 1990 Farm Bill, farmers ~ere prolubited from harvesting any crops 
on 0/92 acres.  Beginning in 1991, farmers will have the option of harvesting minor 
oilseed crops, approved by the USDA, on 0/92 acres.  Farmers that do so have two 
options.  One, they may receive deficiency payments for the program crop and forgo 
eligibility for all marketing loans regarding that minor oilseed crop.  Two, they may 
retain marketing loan eligibility, but they must forego deficiency payments on 0/92 acres. 
Also, farmers may choose not to harvest crops on 0/92 acres, as was previously done. 
Additionally, F  ACf does not allow haying and grazing on conservation use acres 
(ARP, 0/92, etc., except ECARP acres) during for the five-month, principal, growing 
season designated by the State ASCS committee.  Also, except in arid and summer 
fallow areas, F  ACf requires commodity program participants to plant an  annual or 
perennial cover crop on 50% of ARP acres and the 0/92 acres not planted to a minor 
oilseed crop. 
10 Scenario 5.  Commodity Promm Only 
The following equations can be used to estimate net returns for producers using 
only the government commodity program.  Equation (5) describes estimation of net 
returns under this scenario.  The $75,000 limit relating to Findley payments may be 
reduced depending on returns generated by marketing loans. 
k  . 
TNR =  ~  N~  + ~ N~  + ~ NRr 
c=l  z=l  f=l 
(5) 
where: 
TNR  =  total net returns, 
N~  =  net returns resulting from participation in a government commodity 
program; excludes returns from producing oilseed crops on 0/92 acres 
and from producing crops on flex acres, 
N~  =  net returns from producing an eligible oilseed crop on 0/92 acres, and 
NRf  =  net returns from producing an eligible crop on flex  acres. 
Returns from participating in a government commodity program: 
n 
~ NR  =  c=l  e 
(5.1 ) 
n 
{mine  ~ PAYe - [FDPe * PYe * PAJ), $50,000)  + 
c=l 
n 
min\~l  [FDPe * PYe * PAJ, $75,000)}} 
11 where: 
c  - crop c,  an eligible crop for participation in the government 
commodity programs, 
Pc:  =  market price, crop c ($/unit), 
FLc:  =  formula loan rate, crop c ($/unit), 
Yc:  =  average yield on planted acreage, crop c (unit/acre), 
VCc:  =  variable costs of production, crop c ($/  acre), 
FCc:  =  fixed costs ($ / acre), 
GVc  =  grazing value ($/acre), 
PAc  =  acres of crop c planted and eligible for deficiency payments; 
where: 
(5.2) 
MP  Ac  =  maximum payment acres, crop c; 
where: 
(5.3) 
BAc:  =  base acres, crop c, 
ARPc  =  acreage repuction program acres, 
where: 
ARPc:  =  ARRc * B~  (5.4) 
ARRc  =  acreage reduction requirement (% of BAc), 
FLEXc  =  flex· acreage (% of BAc), 
12 CUAc  =  conservation use acreage (0/92 option) (between 0 and 92% of 
MPAc), 
MCe  =  maintenance cost on diverted acres ($/acre), 
OSG  Ve  =  off-season grazing value ($/  acre), 
NCUAc  =  acres of CUAc planted to a resource conserving use crop (excludes 
acres allocated to minor oi1seeds), 
NCF  Ae  =  non-crop FLEXc acres, (i.e., acres left as a green manure crop), 
PAYe  =  government payments, crop c ($) 
where: 
if  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres (and forgoes 
marketing loan eligibility for oilseeds), then: 
PAYe  =  {[DPe * PYe * PAJ + [{CUAe - (MPAe *.OB)}  * 
max{DPe, PRCUe} * PYJ} 
(5.5) 
if a farmer forgoes receiving deficiency payments on 0/92 acres in order 
to remain eligible for oilseed marketing loans, then: 
(5.6) 
DPe  =  deficiency payments ($/unit), 
where: 
FDPe  =  Findley payment ($/unit), 
where: 
(5.B) 
13 TPe:  =  target price (S/umt), 
NP5e:  =  national average price, five-month base (S/unit), 
NP12e:  =  national average price, 12-month base (S/unit), 
ELe:  =  effective national average loan rate, crop c (S/unit), 
PYe:  =  program yield (bu/acre), and 
PRCUe:  =  guaranteed payment rate on 0/92 acreage, which is equal to the 
estimated (projected) deficiency payment (S/umt) 
Returns from  oilseed crops planted on 0/92 acres:3 
If  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres and forgoes eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~ NR:z  =  z=l 
If  a farmer forgoes deficiency payments on 0/92 acres to retain eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
(5.9) 
:E  NR:z  =  z=l  (5.10) 
where: 
z  =  an eligibleTIlinor oilseed crop z (as determined by the USDA), 
Pz  =  market price, minor oilseed crop z (S/umt), 
Yz  =  yield, minor oilseed crop z (unit/acre), 
VCz  =  variable cost of producing minor oilseed crop z (S/acre), 
3  NR:z only includes returns from crop production, on 0/92 acreage.  Deficiency 
payments from 0/92 participation are included in N~  in the PAYe: variable. 
14 FCz  =  fixed costs ($/  acre), 
CU~  =  conselVation use acres allocated to minor oilseed crop z4, 
~ =  effective marketing loan rate for minor oilseed crop z ($/unit), 
WPz  =  world market price for minor oilseed crop z (S/unit). 
Returns from crops planted on flex acres: 
j 




f~l {[(max (Pc,  ELJ * YJ - VCc- FCc- GVJ * FLEXc }  (5.11) 
f  =  eligible crops for production of flex acres (as determined by the 
USDA), 
Pc  =  market price, crop f ($/unit), 
ELc  =  effective national average loan rate, if  crop f is a commodity 
program crop (S/unit), 
Yc  =  average yield on planted acreage (unit/acre), 
VCc  =  variable cost of producing crop f ($/acre), 
FCc  =  fixed costs ($/acre), 
GVc  =  grazing value (S/acre), and 
FLEXc  =  flex  acres planted to crop f,s 
4  Returns associated with conselVation use acres that are not planted to minor 
oilseeds are accounted for in equation (5.1) under the NCU~  variable. 
S  Returns associated with flex acres that are not planted to a crop are accounted 
for in equation (5.1) under the NCFAc variable.  . 
15 Scenario 6.  Commodity Program with Crop Insurance 
Government programs help reduce income variability but do not provide income 
replacement for yield losses.  The following equations describe how net returns can be 
estimated, while accounting for crop insurance when the farm operator also participates 
in the government commodity program.  The same payment limits specified before 
remain for this scenario. 
The equations are: 
(6) 
Returns from participating in a government commodity program: 
n  n 
~ NR  =  c=l  e  C~l  {[[(max{P~' ,  ELe}  * Ye) - VCe - C1e - FCc + GVe  (6.1) 
+ max{O, IPe * [(lYe * LCe) - Y  J}] * PAJ -
{(MCe + FCc - OSGVe) * (ARPe + NCVAe + NCFAe)}  + 
n 
{min(c~lAYe  - [FDPe * PYe * PAJ), $50,000)  + 
n 
min~~l  [FDPe * PYe * PAJ, $75,OOO)}} 
where: 
C1e  =  crop insurance premium ($/acre), 
where: 
(6.2) 
16 IYe  =  insurance yield (unit/acre) (IO-year yield based on actual 
production history for insurance or assigned with the assistance 
of the FCIC), 
IPe  =  commodity indemnity price election ($/unit) (three price elections 
available: low, medium, high), 
LCe  =  level of coverage (three levels available: 50%, 65%, or 75%), 
and 
PRe  =  premium rate (set by FCIC). 
Returns from oilseed crops planted on 0/92 ac;es,  with crop insurance: 
If  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres and forgoes eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~ N~  =  z=1 
If  a farmer forgoes deficiency payments on 0/92 acres to retain eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k  k 
~ N~  =  z=1 
~ {[[Pz + max«~  - WPz), 0) * YJ - VCz - C4 - FCJ  z=1 
+  max{O,  IPz * [(IYz * LCz)  - YJ}l * CU~} 
Returns from crops planted on flex acres,  with crop insurance: 
j 
~ NRc  =  f=1  ~ {[(max (Pc, ELe)  * YJ - VCe  - Cle - FCc - GVJ 
f=1 




(6.5) Scenario 7.  Commodity Prowm with the Consenation Resene ProWm 
The government commodity program, including optional programs, can be used 
in conjunction with the CRP.  Acres diverted into CUA and FLEX are ineligible for 
CRP participation.  The relationships that affect net returns when a farm operator 
participates in the commodity program and the CRP are described by the following 
equations. 
k  . 
TNR = ~  NRc  +  :E  N~  +  ~ NRc 
c=1  z=l  f=l  (7) 
Returns from participating in a government commodity program: 
n  n 
:E  NR  =  c=1  c  C~l  {[[(max{Pc , ELc}  * Yc) - VCc - FCc + GV  J  * PAJ - (7.1) 
{(MCc + FCc - OSGVc) * (ARPc + NCUAc + NCFAc)}  -
n 
$50,000}  + {mine f=fAYc - [FDPc * PYc * PAJ), $50,000)  + 
n 
min~~l  [FDPc * PYc * PAJ, $75,000)}} 
where: 
- II 
ECc  =  Annualized establishment costs of CRP acres ($/acres), 
CRAc  =  conservation reserve acreage (  acres), and 
CRRPc  =  conservation reserve rental payment ($/acre). 
18 Returns from oilseed crops planted on 0/92 acres (acres are ineligible for the CRP program): 
H a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres and forgoes eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~N~  =  z=1 
H a farmer forgoes deficiency payments on 0/92 acres to retain eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~ N~  =  z=1 
Returns from  crops planted on flex acres  (acres are ineligible for the CRP program): 
j 




Scenario 8.  Commodity Program with Crop Insurance and the Conservation Reserve 
Program 
Crop insurance can be purchased by producers participating in  the government 
commodity program and the conservation reserve program.  The following equations 
describe how to estimate net returns when the farm operator simultaneously participates 
in the aforementioned programs. 
(8) 
19 Returns from participating in a government commodity program: 
+ max{O, IPe •  [(IYe • LCc) - YJ}] • PAJ -
{(MCe + FCc - OSGVc) •  (ARPe + NCUAc + NCFAc)} -
n 
{(MCc + ECe + FCc) •  CRAc}  + min{c~1(CRRPe •  CRAc), 
n 
$50,000}  + {mine ~=fAYe  - [FDPe • PVc • PAJ), $50,000)  + 
n 
min~~l  [FDPe • PYe • PAJ, $75,000)}} 
Returns from  oilseed crops planted on 0/92 acres,  with crop insurance (0/92 acres are 
ineligible for the CRP program): 
(8.1) 
If  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres and forgoes eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~ N~  =  z=l 
+ max{O, IPz •  [(IYz • LCz) - Y J}] •  CUAzl 
If  a farmer forgoes deficiency payments on 0/92 acres to retain eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k  k 
~N~  =  z=1  z~1{[[Pz + max((MLz - WPz), 0) • YJ - VCz - C4 - FCJ 
+ max{O,  IPz •  [(IYz • LCz) - YJ}] •  CU~} 
20 
(8.2) 
(8.3) Returns from  crops planted on flex acres,  with crop insurance (flex acres are ineligible for the 
eRP program): 
J 1NRc =  fA {[(max (Pr, ELJ • YJ - VCr - C~  - FCr - GVJ 
+ max{O,  IPr •  [(lYr • LCJ - YJ)] •  FLE~} 
Scenario 9.  Commodity Promm with the Intewted Farm Manaeement Proi'"am 
Qption. 
Commodity program participants will have a new option available to them in 
(8.4) 
1991.  The Integrated Farm Management Program Option (IFM), encourages cropping 
flexibility and resource conserving rotations.  Participating farmers enter three- to five-
year contracts with the USDA for all or part of their farm.  The IFM requires that an 
average of 20% of all program crops' base acres be devoted to a resource-conserving 
crop.  Planted acres in the IFM must include a legume, but not beans harvested for seed. 
The legume may be planted along with any grass and/or eligible, non-program, small 
grains like, rye, buckwheat, or triticale. 
Base acreage and deficiency payments are protected under the IFM.  Farmers 
may not harvest non-program small grain crops on the IFM acres.  Acres"in the IFM can 
not be used for hay or grazing during the five-month principle growing season 
established by the state ASCS committee.  Unlike the 0/92 option, a minimum level for 
deficiency payments is not guaranteed.  If  a farmer selects the IFM, 50% of AJU> 
acreage can be included in the IFM.  Unlike other IFM acres, ARP acres in the IFM 
may be used for hay or grazing at anytime. 
The following equations can be used for estimation of net returns when 
participating in the IFM. 
21 where: 
(9) 
N~  =  net returns from the IFM option.  Does not include deficiency 
payments from eligible IFM acres (these are included in N~  via the 
variable PAYe)'  . 
Returns from participating in a government commodity program: 
n  n 
~ NR  =  c=1  e  ~ {[[(max{Pe' ELe}  • Ye) - VCe - FCc  + GV  J  • PAJ - c=1 
(9.1) 
where: 
{(MCe  + FCc - OSGVe)  •  (ARPe + NCU~  + NCFAe)}  + 
n 
{mine  ~ PAYe - [FDPe • PYe • PAJ), $50,000)  + 
c=1 
PAc  =  acres of crop c,  planted; 
where: 
P~  =  MPA  - CUA  - IFM  c  c  e 
CUAc  =  conservation use acreage (0/92 option) (between 0 and 92% of 
MP  ACI  less, IFMc acres), 
(9.2) 
IFMc  =  acres normally planted to crop c allocated to IFM.  This represents 
acres removed from planted acres only; it doe"s not include IFM 
acres under the ARP. And, 
PAYc  =  government payments, crop c ($) 
where: 
22 if  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres (and forgoes 
marketing loan eligIbility for oi1seeds) and elects not to harvest small grains 
on IFM acres, then: 
PAYe  =  {(DPe• PYe • (PAc + IFMc)] + [{CUAc-
(MPAc ·.08)} • max{DPe, PRCUe} • PYJ} 
(9.3) 
if  a farmer forgoes receiving deficiency payments on 0/92 acres in order 
to remain eligible for oilseed marketing loans and elects not to harvest small 
grains on IFM acres, then: 
(9.4) 
Returns from oilseed crops planted on 0/92 acres: 
If  a farmer receives deficiency payments on 0/92 acres and forgoes eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k 
~N~  =  z=l 
If  a farmer forgoes deficiency payments on 0/92 acres to retain eligibility for 
oilseed marketing loans, then: 
k  k 
~ N~  =  z=l 
~ ([[Pz + max((~  - WPz), 0) • YJ - VCz - FCJ •  CU~} 
z=1 
Retums from crops planted on flex acres: 





(9.8) Returns from production on [FM acres: 
h 
~ NRm = 
m = 1 
(9.9) 
where: 
m  =  resource conserving crop m, eliglble for IFM participation, 
The following variables involve IFM acres removed from payment acreage.  They are 
only relevant before, or" after, the principal five-month growing season. 
Pm  =  market price, crop m,  ($/unit), 
Ym  =  yield, crop m (unit/acre), 
VCm  =  variable cost of producing crop m (S/acre), 
FCm  =  fixed costs ($/acre), 
IFMm  =  acres of m in the IFM, 
The following variables involve IFM acres under the ARP being used for hay or grazing. 
They are relevant at anytime. 
Hm  =  hay returns from ARP acres in the IFM, 
GV  m  =  grazing value from ARP acres in the IFM, and 
ARPIF  m  =  ARP acres in the IFM. 
24 SUMMARY 
This report provides a revision of a 1989 report that developed mathematical 
formulas to calculate net returns for farm operators, given certain scenarios of 
government program participation.  The equations developed and described in  this 
report update the 1989 formulas by incorporating changes brought about by the 1990 
Farm Bill as of April 1991.  These equations can be used to facilitate research, extension, 
and classroom education programs that require the use of net return estimates for 
alternative government program scenarios. 
Scenarios 1 - 4 describe the estimation of net returns when the farm enterprises 
under consideration are not enrolled in the government commodity program.  Scenarios 
5 - 9 characterize estimation of net returns when one or more of the farm enterprises is 
enrolled in the government commodity program.  The 1989 staff paper included 
provisions for disaster aid and optional paid land diversion.  These options are not 
currently available for 1991  and, thus, not included in this report. 
Although government programs that supplement farm income are intermittently 
revised, this report can serve as a framework for future research dealing with the 
estimation of net returns under various government program scenarios. 
25 TABLE 1.  1991 Parameter Values for Government Commodity Programs 
Government  Grain 
Program  Wheat  Com  Sorghum  Soybeans 
Acreage 
Reduction 
Requirement  15%  7.5%  7.5%  N/A 
(ARR) 
FLEX 
Requirement  15%  15%  15%  N/A 
(0/92) Option  yes  yes  yes  N/A 
Target Price 
(TP)  $4.00/bu  $2.75fbu  $2.61/bu  N/A 
Effective 
Loan Rate  $2.04/bu  $1.62/bu  $1.54/bu  N/A 
(EL) 
Marketing 
Loan Rate  N/A  N/A  N/A  $5.02/bu 
(ML)2 
.. 
Payment Rate  $1.40/bu 
Conservation  $.58/bu  $.56/bu  N/A 




Loan Rate  $2.52/bu  $1.91/bu  $1.81/bu  N/A 
(FL) 
Advance  $.56/bu 





1  Sunflower, Canola, Rapeseed, Safflower, F1axseed, and Mustard Seed 
2  Marketing loans will be reduced by a two percent origination fee. 













..  Values for winter wheat farmers who elect to FLEX 15% of their base in the 90-91  crop and 
receive payments based on the five-month price and 75%  of their base acreage. 
S  ADP is equal to 40%  of the estimated (projected) deficiency payment . 
.  NjA =  Not Applicable 
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